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ABSTRACT 
Hezbollah has proven itself to be a resilient, relevant, military and political force 
within Lebanon as well as across the Middle Eastern region. This thesis focuses on the 
approach through which Hezbollah, as a military, political and social organization 
integrates itself into Lebanese society and polity. This thesis looks at how an Islamic 
organization, perceived as a “terrorist-group” in the mid-1980s, continues to transform 
itself and achieve success in being perceived as a legitimate political actor participating 
in Lebanese government. 
Political integration is problematic for Hezbollah, since it must balance its need to 
be a legitimate actor within Lebanon's political system with its original, and continuing, 
militant objectives of liberating Lebanon and other territories under Israeli control, and in 
general protecting the country from Israeli incursion. The first objective requires 
Hezbollah to be sensitive to the needs of Lebanon and its many political factions and 
internal interests. The second objective requires Hezbollah to maintain its radical stance 
toward a neighboring state, maintain a large armed militia, and form alliances with 
external actors such as Syria and Iran independent of the policies of the Lebanese 
government. How can Hezbollah balance these interests? This thesis explores how 
Hezbollah seeks to reconcile these seemingly contradictory objectives.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Hezbollah1 presents itself as somewhat of an enigma to the casual observer. 
Popular culture depicts Hezbollah as Janus-faced organization,2 simultaneously holding 
sinister and benevolent titles as a terrorist organization and benefactor of the needy. It has 
been–and elements of the organization continue to be–a highly secretive organization, 
infamous for its aggressive martial resistance to political rivals (e.g., Israel, Lebanese 
Government, rival domestic militias, the United States, etc.) and for its historical use of 
violence on the domestic, regional and international stage. Furthermore, it maintains a 
formidable militia that is well outside of the Lebanese government’s control. Hezbollah 
has latitude in its freedom of action inside and outside of the state, imposing policies over 
which the Lebanese state has little or no control.  
Conversely, Hezbollah earns admiration by an increasing number of supporters 
and grudging praise by critics as a positive societal force. This accolade stems directly 
from Hezbollah’s generous domestic social programs, which fill a critical gap in services 
the Lebanese state is unable or unwilling to provide. 
This thesis discusses the historical forces facilitating an atmosphere favorable to 
the formation of Hezbollah, the role of Hezbollah in Lebanese politics, and the future 
ramifications caused by Hezbollah’s approach to participation in the Lebanese political 
process. The discussion attempts to provide a methodical, historical analysis using Social 
Movement Theory (SMT). When viewed through this analytical lens, Hezbollah should 
be seen as a flexible, nuanced and pragmatic political institution not merely a dogmatic 
religious organization, armed political militia, or simply a social-services movement. It is 
all of these combined. 
 
                                                 
1 Spellings of Hezbollah will range from Hezbollah to Hizbullah due to various authors’ 
transliterations. 
2 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 187. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Hezbollah has proven itself to be a resilient, relevant, military and political force 
within Lebanon as well as across the Middle Eastern region. It has been argued that the 
initial reason for Hezbollah’s existence came from resistance to Israeli occupation of 
Southern Lebanon, continuation of the “Islamic Revolution”3 (started by Iran in 1979) 
and general “oppression by the superpowers of the third world.”4 However, as of May 24, 
2000, and the final withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of Lebanon, the threat by 
which Hezbollah potentially defined itself had been (for the most part) physically 
removed. How then would a newly “liberated” Lebanese populous feel about a powerful, 
non-state actor within its borders? Does the Israeli toehold in the Shib’a Farms provide 
adequate political justification for Hezbollah’s continued armed resistance? If so, what 
about Hezbollah’s aggressive 2008 actions within Lebanon itself; specifically, the 
apparent will to exert their political opinion through the calculated application of martial 
coercion against the Lebanese political structure? 
Elements of this thesis center on the approach in which Hezbollah as a military, 
political and social organization integrates itself into Lebanese society and polity. It will 
look at how an Islamic organization, perceived as a “terrorist-group” in the mid-1980s, 
continues to transform itself into a legitimate political actor participating in Lebanese 
government. How does Hezbollah balance its need to be a legitimate actor within 
Lebanon's political system with its original, and continuing, militant objectives of 
liberating Lebanon and other territories under Israeli control, and in general, protecting 
the country from Israeli incursion? The first objective requires Hezbollah to be sensitive 
to the needs of Lebanon and its many political factions and internal interests. The second 
objective requires Hezbollah to maintain its radical stance toward a neighboring state, 
sustain a large armed militia, and form alliances with external actors such as Syria and 
                                                 
3 Norton, Hezbollah, 134. 
4 Ibid., 38. 
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Iran independent of the policies of the Lebanese government. How can Hezbollah 
balance these interests? This thesis explores how Hezbollah seeks to reconcile these 
seemingly contradictory objectives.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Understanding the transformational dynamic of political inclusion leading to the 
potential moderation of a non-state, rational actor is critical to accurate analytic 
assessment and policy formulation. Since Hezbollah has been assessed to be a significant 
threat to the United States’ domestic territory, global allies, and national interests, it is 
crucial to view the group through the proper analytical lens. If the spirit of former Deputy 
Secretary of State Richard Armitage’s famously quoted passage of a 2002 speech 
addressing the threat posed by Hezbollah as, “the A-team of terrorists, while al-Qaida 
may actually be the B-team,”5 is to be taken at face value, then sober examination of how 
credible a threat that Hezbollah actually poses is required. Hezbollah does not appear to 
pose a direct threat to the U.S., but it does threaten American regional interests by (1) 
acting as a proxy force for Iran; (2) threatening Israel; and (3) sponsoring radical factions 
in Palestine and Iraq. Therefore, it is important to understand the motivations and 
strategic drivers of Hezbollah to formulate effective policies to moderate it or contain it. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The challenge raised by some stereotypical, historical framing of Hezbollah as a 
criminal terrorist organization belies the fact that between 1985 and present day, 
significant changes have occurred within the organization’s leadership, philosophy and 
style of political expression. If Hezbollah is neatly placed in the “terrorist column” of 
categorization, it is the author’s opinion that doing so masks an important opportunity to 
evaluate the organization as a rational actor–an actor whose possible long-term goals are 
to moderate and seek legitimate inclusion in the political process.  
                                                 
5 Eben Kaplain, “The Al-Qaeda-Hezbollah Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11275/alqaedahezbollah_relationship.html. 
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In contradiction to the sentiment expressed by former Deputy Secretary of State 
Armitage, an alternate academic school of thought revolves around the theme of, 
“Hizbullah [is] more similar to the Irish Republican Army than to the Al-Qaeda network. 
They are a national resistance [movement] whose primary aim has been to end foreign 
occupation of their lands.” Furthermore, “Simultaneously, [Hizbullah is a] political party 
that participate[s] in national politics… [and by doing so]... turn increasingly pragmatic. 
The result is that the leadership and rank and file [become] increasingly socialized into 
the culture of the democratic politics, leading one to believe that they were well on their 
way to become [a] “normal” [party].”6  
This thesis explores three perspectives on Hezbollah: One views Hezbollah as a 
hardened ideological movement incapable of moderation and accommodation with the 
United States and the second views Hezbollah as a malleable and pragmatic organization 
on its way to moderation. The third perspective, argued in this thesis, takes the middle 
ground, arguing Hezbollah is strictly neither one; it comprises elements of both. 
Two characteristic, archetypal themes appear: one casting Hezbollah as a 
villainous terrorist group bent on Islamic domination and the destruction of Israel, and the 
second caricature portraying Hezbollah as a victim of circumstance: a heroic resistance 
organization earnestly trying to moderate, obtain political credentials and join the 
legitimate political process. The author claims that the truth lies somewhere between 
these two poles, despite the emotional policy fog and rhetoric created by years of 
violence between Hezbollah and its critics and enemies. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature reviewed for this thesis approaches Hezbollah from three broad 
perspectives. The first perspective represents Hezbollah as a terrorist organization bent on 
the destruction of Israel and acting as a spoiler to all U.S. policy in the region. The 
second looks at Hezbollah as a rational actor with a legitimate roll as a resistance force 
against Israeli occupation of Lebanon, as well as a developing political force within the 
                                                 
6 Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World 
(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), 129. 
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Lebanese political space. The third perspective is a balanced view, showing Hezbollah to 
be a political resistance organization whose past actions are not altogether “clean” (i.e., 
sponsorship of terrorist-like activities), yet which also has demonstrated responsible 
institutional behavior in line with international norms (i.e., providing social services to 
citizens, generally obeying rules of war and often acting with transparency as to their 
state’s goals and actions). This thesis focuses on and argues for the third perspective.  
Source material reviewed for this thesis included books, online newspaper articles 
and other publications. Generally, the books were neutral or sympathetic in their 
treatment of Hezbollah, and reasonably judgmental of both the good and bad actions of 
the group. Most literature rather hawkish towards Hezbollah was in the form of online 
policy papers and opinion pieces. These pieces, while containing some insightful 
observations, were minimized in analysis due to the outright bias they exhibited.  
The best, most well-balanced and concise historical analysis is Hezbollah: A Short 
History, by Augusts Norton.7 Norton chronicles the rise of Hezbollah from its origins as 
an offshoot of the southern Lebanese Shi’a group Amal. The narrative is straightforward, 
utilizing a historical narrative style, and revolves around the factors leading to 
Hezbollah’s formation. Norton’s narrative encompasses inception of the group to late 
2006, describing the ramifications of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war, and more 
significantly, the play for power Hezbollah made with a call (and some could argue 
“blackmail” tactics) for a unity government. Events of history have shown Norton’s 
predictive analysis [in the concluding chapter] to be correct, with Hezbollah seemingly 
achieving its goals of establishing a unity government, under President Michel Suleiman 
in May 2008. The current structure of the Lebanese government gives Hezbollah what 
they have been seeking: an, “ability to veto government decisions.” 8 
A balanced look at the reasons Hezbollah formed, is given by Mohammed 
Ayoob,9 detailing a parallel, historical example between Hamas and Hezbollah showing 
                                                 
7 Norton, Hezbollah, 187. 
8 Christopher M. Blanchard and Jeremy M. Sharp, “Lebanon,” CRS Report for Congress (June 12, 
2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33509.pdf. 
9 Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, 213. 
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them to be two groups who have resistance to a foreign occupier as their primary reason 
for existence. Ayboob makes clear an important distinction of Hezbollah as a group that 
is not solely interested in sowing the seeds of local or trans-national terrorism. He 
demonstrates that Hezbollah’s goals are very local in nature and have a clear strategic 
objective.  
It is clear from the discussion that Hizbullah and Hamas are more similar 
to the Irish Republican Army than to the Al Qaeda network. They are 
national resistance movements whose primary aim has been to end foreign 
occupation to of their lands. …They are political parties that participate in 
national politics with the aim of influencing their countries; domestic and 
foreign polices. …In the process they have turned increasingly pragmatic. 
…Their leadership is …becoming increasingly socialized into the culture 
of democratic politics, leading one to believe that they were well on their 
way to becoming “normal” political parties.10 
A local, first-hand, historical perspective is offered by Hala Jaber”s, Hezbollah, 
Born with a Vengeance. Her narrative spans from local interviews with Hezbollah leaders 
from inception of the group concluding with the ending of the Israeli military Operation 
Grapes of Wrath in 1996. Jaber’s factual, if somewhat sympathetic, account details 
multiple Lebanese perspectives on the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon, reasons 
for resistance, support for (and against) Hezbollah. Particularly stirring is a detailed 
account of the IDF shelling of the United Nations-occupied town of Qana and the 
dramatic death of 109 Lebanese refugees.11 The upshot of the book is the point that 
Hezbollah appears to moderating and assimilating into the political arena. However, the 
major hindrance to assisting or speeding this transition is the branding of Hezbollah as a 
stereotypical terrorist organization. “So long as the West and Israel continue to regard the 
problem as a crusade against terrorism they are in effect denying their own responsibility 
for fostering the conditions which gave rise to Hezbollah. …[By branding the Resistance 
as “terrorists” it can continue to deny legitimacy to Hezbollah’s cause].”12 
                                                 
10 Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World, 129. 
11 Hala Jabar, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 169. 
12 Ibid., 214. 
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A policy-focused book centering on Hezbollah is Judith Harik’s, Hezbollah, The 
Changing Face of Terrorism. In it, she delves into a historically based account of 
Hezbollah’s formation with a summation of U.S. policy reaction towards the group in a 
pre and post-9/11 world. Harik emphasizes the political motivations of the Bush 
Administration with regard to branding Hezbollah a terrorist organization, and the 
ramifications that label ultimately has on furthering U.S. foreign policy goals in Lebanon 
(and the region), as well as the hindrance it places on possibly aiding Hezbollah’s 
assimilation into mainstream Lebanese politics. Additionally, the book explores the links 
between the Asad regime of Syria (and Iran) and its control/support for Hezbollah. Of 
special note is her point that perceptions of the United States as an impartial, “honest 
broker” in the region are greatly damaged by the policy of branding Hezbollah a terrorist 
organization as well as the seemingly passive acquiescence to any and all aggressive 
Israeli policies towards [and within] Lebanon.13  
Lastly, a completely firsthand account is given by Naim Qassem, the Deputy 
Secretary General of Hezbollah, in Hizbullah, The Story From Within. Although a 
completely biased, outright supportive view of Hezbollah, it does offer insight into the 
group’s philosophy as well as an intimate perspective of someone on the receiving end of 
U.S. and Israeli policy sanctions. Qassem’s narrative does have the tendency to be 
tediously thorough; however, it is hard to argue with his comments on U.S. policy. 
Qassem is not myopic. He demonstrates an intellectual command of the issues at worst 
on par with, and at times superior to, most Western policy makers–this fact alone makes 
his discussion points most compelling. A telling passage illustrates his attitudes well with 
regard to the on-again, off-again offers of U.S. Congressmen to meet with Hezbollah.  
United States hostility has manifested itself through words and actions 
alike, and has encompassed all aspects and phases of the Party’s presence. 
This stands in contrast with Hezbollah’s beliefs and actual conduct, both 
being in harmony with Islam’s principals and with the cause of legitimate 
resistance against Israeli occupation. As such, the Party considered calls 
for meeting and dialogue as communicated through some United States 
Congress officials to be futile. …The encounter between the Party and the 
                                                 
13 Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah; the Changing Face of Terrorism (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Ltd, 2007), 201. 
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United States administration would not add anything new to the 
acquaintance of each side with the other’s views and would not alter the 
stance on either side.14 
Due to the author’s own Western, secular bias, Qassim’s essay does lose 
credibility at times when he launches into anti-Western tirades about the seeming 
superiority of a Muslim way of governance, but his penchant for favoring an Islamic state 
is tempered by reasonable rationale. It is an alternative to the corruption of the current 
Lebanese secular government. Overall, the text is part guidebook–it methodically spells 
out the political goals of Hezbollah (down to the specifying the voting age of 
constituents)–and part editorial, sufficiently interspersed with political commentary 
steeped in anti-U.S. and Israeli opinions. It is a useful insight into seeing this group 
through their own eyes and offers excellent perspective into how they perceive the 
“carrots and sticks” offered to them by various U.S. administrations (sticks mostly) and 
regional neighbors (Syria and Iran, offering carrots). 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
Historical study method are used focusing on Hezbollah as well as possibly 
drawing analogies to “like sister resistance groups”–Hamas for example–to help tease out 
the metrics by which Hezbollah measures success of its policies. Primarily, sources that 
cite direct opinions of Hezbollah leaders, party members and general Lebanese citizenry 
are sought to see if, one, these individuals believe that their group is making progress and 
two, what types of milestones should be reached that would potentially symbolize goal-
achievement. 
The source material, which supports this approach is mainly newspaper and 
magazine articles (online) and opinion/ editorial pieces in regional newspapers (i.e., the 
Beirut based “Daily Star”). Excellent analytical background materials that outline the 
U.S.’ policy dispassionately and paint an antiseptic, bird’s-eye, world-view of the 
situation are CRS Reports for Congress.  
                                                 
14 Naim Qassem, Hizbullah, the Story from within, trans., Dalia Khalil (London: Saqi, 2005), 249. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The crux of the thesis aims to show a refined analysis of key events in 
Hezbollah’s historically demonstrated behavior and policy as well as show how it has 
adjusted itself to the shifting realities of the Lebanese political space and its Shi’a 
constituency.  
The thesis is organized into thirds. One third deals with the political history of 
Lebanon and the Shi’a polity. The second third analyzes Hezbollah through the lens of 
Social Movement Theory (SMT). It looks at Hezbollah’s possible moderation detailing 
significant contemporary events with respect to how those events position the party for 
integration into present-day Lebanese politics. The last third is the conclusion. 
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II. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE LEBANESE SHI’A 
POLITICAL SITUATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Hezbollah is currently considered the force in Shi’a Lebanese political circles. 
Controversy surrounds the group and its dramatic history. It is a domestic political 
organization as well as an international resistance movement against Israel. Western 
governments consider it a terrorist organization. While these titles are correct, the sterility 
of these terms fails to capture the character of the group adequately. Hezbollah has 
undergone a significant evolution during its twenty-four year existence. It is a political 
movement in the unique position (within Lebanon) of maintaining exclusive control of a 
quasi or grudgingly tolerated, independent militia. As a result, the group is viewed as a 
destabilizing threat to the sclerotic balance of Lebanese state political sovereignty. 
Conversely, this same “threatening” militia is also reluctantly supported for the 
sake of pan-Arab solidarity and in response to Israeli aggression felt by a majority of the 
populace. History has proven that Hezbollah has been an effective deterrent to Israeli 
invasion, a credible supporter of the Palestinian cause as well as a benevolent (and 
effective) domestic social services provider. These successes are completely independent 
of the government of Lebanon and have earned Hezbollah credibility. Even the most 
jaded of political detractors acknowledges Hezbollah’s accomplishments.15  
The duality of the love-hate relationship that Hezbollah has with the Lebanese 
polity creates an interesting study. Hezbollah’s political goals do not always run in 
parallel to the majority of Lebanese Shi’a and this often causes tension. To be sure, 
Hezbollah takes care of itself first and foremost; however, it does garner respect. To 
understand fully why Hezbollah can be supported emotionally while at the same time  
 
 
                                                 
15 Eitan Azani, Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, from Revolution to Institutionalization (New 
York: Palgrave MacMillian, 2009), 245. 
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disliked intellectually, it is helpful to look at the history of Shi’a Lebanese political 
suppression. The history demonstrates the oftentimes paradoxical, pragmatic choices 
Shi’a have made to either be involved in government, or simply be left alone to live. 
This chapter explains the motivational foundations behind the current Shi’a 
political activism embodied by Hezbollah. As the chapter shows, Shi’a political 
mobilization did not happen overnight in 1979, but it did accelerate quickly in the second 
half of the twentieth century after being dormant under the Ottoman Empire. The 
historically deprived Lebanese Shi’a endured centuries of oppression and political 
quietism only to be politically mobilized by Sayyid Musa al-Sadr in the late 1950s, 
radicalized by the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s presence within Lebanon in the 
late 1960s,16 and energized by the demonstrative effect of the Iranian revolution in the 
late 1970s. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
1. Historical Shi’a Discrimination 
At the heart of Hezbollah’s success is the appeal the group holds for many 
economically and politically deprived Lebanese Shi’a. Political and social discrimination 
faced by Lebanese Shi’a is an unfortunate legacy of their religious history; however, this 
was not always the case. In the tenth century, Shi’ism was dominant in the Muslim world 
with the rule of the Baghdad-based Buyid, and Cairo-based Fatimid dynasties. Shi’ism 
was dominant from Persia [modern-day Iran] to Mesopotamia [Iraq], the Levantine 
region and throughout North Africa. 
This situation changed in the 1100s, with the decline of both Shi’a empires and 
the rise of the Sunni Abbassid Empire. The Buyids gradually surrendered territory to 
Sunni Muslim and Saljuq Turks.17 The Sunni-centric Abbassids replaced the Fatimid 
dynasty. “The downfall of the Fatimids and the conquest of Syria by Salah-al-Din-
                                                 
16 The PLO’s autonomous presence within Lebanon was the major contributor leading to the civil war, 
which further radicalized the Shi’a. 
17 John L. Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc, 
2005), 46. 
 11
Ayyubi (Saladin) in 1171 proved impossible to reverse. These events began centuries of 
oppression and persecution of Shiites throughout the Muslim world. The Lebanese 
Shiites, most of whom were Twelver [Shi’a], were no exception.”18 
2. The Composition of Lebanese Shi’a 
The majority of the worldwide Shi’a religious community consists of one of two 
types: “Twelvers,” formally called Ithna Asharis and “Seveners,” formally known as 
Ismailis. The numerical designation of each group derives to which of the twelve original 
Imams (successors of the Prophet Mohammed) each group showed allegiance. This 
allegiance,  
stems from a crisis or was caused by the death or disappearance of their 
Imam and thus the disruption of hereditary succession. For the Twelvers, 
or Ithna Asharis, the end of imamate succession occurred in 874 with the 
disappearance of the twelfth Imam, the child Muhammad al-Muntazar 
(Muhammad, the awaited one). Shi’i theology resolved this dilemma with 
its doctrines of the absence or occultation of the Imam, and his return in 
the future as the Mahdi (the expected one). For Shi’i, the Imam had not 
died but had disappeared and gone into hiding or seclusion. He would 
return as a messianic figure, the Mahdi, at the end of the world to 
vindicate his loyal followers, restore the community to its rightful place, 
and usher in a perfect Islamic society in which truth and justice will 
prevail. During the absence of the hidden Imam, the community was to 
await his return and be guided by its religious experts, mujtahids, those 
ulama (religious scholars) who interpret God’s will, Islamic law, for the 
community.19 
The significance in twenty and twenty-first century Lebanon of seventh and 
twelfth century history is dramatic. On the one hand, there is the theme of deposed (or 
disappeared) Shi’a leadership and on the other, the Shi’a fall from political superiority, 
both having the promise of eventual return. Twelver Shi’a does not hesitate to draw a 
conclusive equivalence between the different centuries. The leaders, names and calendar  
 
                                                 
18 Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 
9. 
19 Esposito, Islam: The Straight Path, 45. 
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dates may be different but the theme is the same. Just as the Shi’a fell from political 
power in 1171, they see today as fulfillment of their destiny as their ‘religiously justified’ 
time to regain political power. 
The coincidence of mysterious disappearance and occultization is not lost upon 
the Lebanese Shi’a: it happened to the most important Shi’a leadership figure of the day 
in 874 (Muhammad al-Muntazar) and, for those who believe, it also happened recently, 
with al-Sadr in 1978. The fact that the “disappearance” of the Imam Musa al-Sadr 
happened 1,104 years later in 1978, is beyond coincidental and substantiates in the minds 
of many Shi’a, that al-Sadr carries the same divine importance as that of the Twelfth 
Imam. The reverence of this status was commensurately conferred onto the Lebanese 
religious and political movement he started: “The Movement of the Deprived.”  
The legitimacy was bolstered by al-Sadr’s disappearance and the credibility of his 
Shi’a social movement solidified, by historical analogy. Consequently, in a creative 
extrapolation of Shi’a mysticism, the “vindication” of their faith is the current trend of 
Shi’a ascendancy toward political power, from Iran in 1979, to Iraq in 2003, to 
[potentially] Lebanon in June 2009.20 The re-emergence of Shi’a political power across 
the Middle East lends credence to those who believe in the messianic return of the Mehdi. 
In receptive Shi’a minds, perhaps the prospect of returning to political power is one of the 
vital natural phases of the vindication prophecy of, “restoring the Shi’a community to its 
rightful place.” Shi’a are experiencing this “vindication” in Lebanon and Hezbollah is 
using this resonating social and religious frame to further their base of support. 
3. Where the Shi’a Settled in Lebanon 
The urban poor of southern and eastern Beirut (also known as the “belt of 
misery”21) and the rural Shi’a of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley are the 
population support-base of Hezbollah. Aiding in the analysis of Hezbollah and their 
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support base, it is helpful to look at how the “base” came to reside where it did. Just as 
the Shi’a were politically marginalized through their share of representation mandated by 
the National Pact of 1943, they were geographically marginalized by displacement in the 
preceding centuries. The overriding theme is a story of political and economic 
domination, started by the physical relocation of Shi’a sects. This forced relocation 
started once interests of the Sunni Muslim empires clashed with the indigenous Shi’a 
residents. Conflict caused by medieval Levantine sectarian friction has been felt not only 
among the Twelver Shi’a of Lebanon, but also has been levied upon their religiously 
distant Lebanese cousins, the Druze, another Shi’a sect in Lebanon. Sometime between 
the tenth and eleventh century, the Druze religion was formed by two Fatimid Empire 
missionaries, Darazi and Hamzi ibn Ali. They had come to Southern Lebanon by 
direction of the Caliph Abu al-Hakim to proselytize and spread the Ismaili (Seveners) 
faith. Ironically, the cycle of Shi’a subjugation would come full circle in later centuries, 
when the Druze–having morphed into their own unique religious sect, thus dropping all 
trappings of “Shi’a-ness”–would, in turn, displace Shi’a within Lebanon. 
4. The Subjugation of Twelver Shi’a in Lebanon 
The precedent of displacement within Lebanon is not unique to the “Seveners.” It 
also happened to the Ithna Asharis (“Twelver”) sect, and from the eleventh century 
onward, reflects a history of persecution. Originally, the Twelver Shi’a settled throughout 
the entirety of terrain in what is today modern Lebanon, with the greatest concentrations 
located on the lower part of Mt. Lebanon and along the coastal cities. However, with the 
downfall of the Fatimid dynasty in 1171, military expeditions of the Mamluks between 
1291 and 1305 expelled Shi’a from all land that was either commercially prosperous or 
tactically significant. The Shi’a, like the Druze, found refuge in what was at that time, 
extremely isolated parts of [modern-day] Lebanon: the Bekaa Valley in the northeast, and 
the arid, undulating, southern interior. 
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Once displaced, the new Shi’a areas of concentration were, “in the infertile zones 
of the Jebel Amil in the south and the Bekaa valley.”22 The fact that they were pushed to 
rugged, infertile and arid lands denote a pattern of economic dislocation that continued 
over the following decades resulting in the Shi’a permanently becoming the underclass of 
Lebanon.  
First the Shiites were replaced by the Sunnis because the coastal cities 
constituted vital trade centers for the Mamluks. Second, the Mamluks 
turned to expel Shiites from the mountains, in particular from Kisirwan, 
which overlooks the coastal roads. Subsequently, the Mamluks substituted 
the Shiites in North Lebanon by Turkman clans to keep watch over the 
coast and secure the mountain roads that led inland to Damascus.23 
The disenfranchisement continued, “under Sunni Ottoman rule over Lebanon 
from 1516 to 1922. The Shiites lost almost all land and authority to the expanding 
Maronite and Druze communities.”24 In 1638, the Shi’a went so far as to request 
independence from the Ottoman Empire. The result was that the Shi’a were attacked, and 
re-subjugated with the loss of 1,500 men. “The persecution of the Shiites by the 
Ottomans was accompanied by a long-standing policy of discrimination. Unlike the 
Sunnis, Christians, and the Druze,25 who were allowed by the Ottoman millet system to 
have their own personal status laws and courts, the Shiites were considered to be 
heterodox by the Ottomans.”26 Exemption from the millet system resulted somewhat 
from the heterodoxy espoused by Sunni Ottomans, but stemmed mostly from concerns 
over political loyalty. Once the Savafid Empire was firmly entrenched in Persia, the 
Ottomans became suspicious of all Shi’a living within their empire–particularly after the 
rulers of the Savafids established good diplomatic relations with the Shi’a living in the 
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24 Ibid., 10. 
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26 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 10. 
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Jabal Amil area of southern Lebanon. As the relations between the Lebanese Shi’a and 
the Persian Savafids improved, the brittle trust accorded the Lebanese Shi’a by their 
Ottoman rulers declined. So much so that, “the Ottomans placed [the Shi’a] under direct 
jurisdiction of Sunni Courts in personal status matters.”27 An illustration of the second-
class citizenship given to the Shi’a was the fact that members of the Shi’a clerical class, 
the ulama, were conscripted during times of war while the Sunni ulama were exempt. 
C. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY POLITICAL LOYALTIES OF THE 
LEBANESE SHI’A 
After the World War I, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the 
French having a League of Nations “ruling mandate” over what is today modern Lebanon 
and Syria. Diverging from the political vision of their Muslim compatriots, the Maronite 
Christian sect pressed the French authorities for their own separate country. The Shiites 
of the newly-delineated “Greater Lebanon” had a conflict. They sensed that the political 
winds were blowing against them and with the Christian Maronites. Political pragmatism 
forced them to ally with their Sunni Muslim constituents. 
Although Ottoman Sunnis had subjugated them over the years, Shi’a saw their 
political fortunes as running in parallel to their fellow Muslims rather than with the 
interests of the French-backed Christians. As a result, the Shi’a supported Sunni desires 
for the establishment of a contiguous Hashemite kingdom. This kingdom would consist 
of both Lebanon and Syria. Secondly, Lebanese Shi’a feared living in a Greater Lebanon 
where the domination of the Maronite state might sentence them to political and social, 
“oblivion.”28 
In a pattern of bad political luck that would similarly be repeated in the Lebanese 
civil war of the 1970s, the Shi’a ended up bearing the large majority of the consequences 
[casualties] of the struggle. The politically connected Ottoman Sunnis managed to side 
step the wrath of the French and allowed the Shi’a to end up being the focus of the 
Greater Lebanon proponents. In taking up arms in defense of Islam–and the Sunnis–the 
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28 Ibid., 11. 
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Shi’a found themselves unwittingly manipulated into being the main target of the 
Maronite-French military campaign. This led to significant armed conflicts with the 
Maronites in 1919 and mid-1920, resulting in the Shi’a of Jabal Amin suffering the full 
brunt of a French force of 4,000 soldiers, aircraft and artillery.29 
After an intense military campaign, Shi’a resistance was crushed and the Shi’a 
notables and ulama were forced to sign a surrender of sorts. This surrender made the 
establishment of Greater Lebanon an inevitability.  
[The surrender in June 1920] made it easier for the French to incorporate 
Jabal ‘Amil and the northern Biq’a into the new state of Greater Lebanon, 
which was formally proclaimed on September 1, 1920. When Lebanon 
became independent on November 22, 1943, the Shiites felt that they were 
the despised stepchildren of a state governed by a Maronite-Sunni 
alliance. Overall, the feeling of Shiite suffering and persecution as a tragic 
experience presented Hizbullah in 1982 with a community vulnerable to 
mass appeal.30 
1. Uneven Political Development 
Once the new independent Lebanese government was functioning after 1943, 
what little political representation or economic benefit the Shi’a gained by controlling the 
largely ceremonial post of Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies, “was appropriated as 
a personal fiefdom by members of a few prominent Lebanese Shiite families.”31 Not only 
were the Shi’a locked out of the top positions that really mattered, but their own elites 
exacerbated the problem. In effect, since Shi’a were the lowest class in society, and thus 
possessed little influence as a population, the “system” was not compelled to concede 
them any significant power. Their relative developmental simplicity and quiescence 
prevented them from standing up and fighting for a bigger share of government. The 
inertia of centuries of subjugation effectively took political activism off the table as a 
                                                 
29 This was not the first time Shi’a would fight and die in significant numbers for a cause that was 
tangentially theirs. A similar thing was to happen during the Lebanese civil war in 1978, when the 
Lebanese Shi’a and PLO were temporary allies. It was said the Palestinian Fedayeen was willing, “to fight 
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30 Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 12. 
31 Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, 124. 
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ready option for the Shi’a. “The Shiites were mainly based in the countryside and had not 
shared to any great extent in the drive toward modernization and education that had 
created a class of elites within the other religious communities and had turned Beirut into 
the intellectual capital of the Arab world. In Shiite society, it was the religious dignitaries 
who maintained the strongest grip.”32 
This balance was not to hold forever. Through the force of simple geometric 
population growth, the demographics of Lebanon were about to change radically.  
The village traditions and poverty of the Shiites led to much higher 
birthrates that in other communities, so that by the 1970s their numbers 
had increased sufficiently to upset the demographic balance on which 
Lebanese politics was based, with no redress forthcoming. Worse, a 
sizable portion of the younger Shiite generation, who could no longer 
make a living on the land, began to migrate to the southern outskirts of the 
capital, where they constituted a poor, highly discontented, and very 
numerous bloc of urbanites who had little respect or time for the Lebanese 
state.33 
2. Watershed Events in Shi’a Political Development 
While changing demographics are helpful in explaining “how” the large base of 
support physically came into existence, several political components explain the “why.” 
These elements radicalized and galvanized the new generation of Lebanese Shi’a from a 
historical stance of quietism and acceptance, to one of activity and intolerance to their 
unequal political and socioeconomic lot in life. These events center on two major events 
in Lebanese history: (1) the arrival of Imam Sayyid Musa al-Sadr in the late 1950s and 
(2) the arrival of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1970s. These two 
events provided the spark (al-Sadr) and the fuel (the PLO) to set off a firestorm of Shi’a 
political mobilization. What started as a smoldering ember of political activism in the 
1950s, lit by Imam al-Sadr, became a fire twenty years later due to the radicalizing effect 
the presence of the PLO had within Lebanon. It was to fire the emergence of radical Shi’a 
political activism.  
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a. The 1948 Arab-Israeli “al Nakba” and Palestinian Refugee 
Immigration into Lebanon 
The defeat of the Arab League during the 1948 Israeli war for 
independence displaced 750,000 Palestinians out of Palestine. The “catastrophe” or al 
Nakba caused 125,000, mostly northern Palestinians, to settle into refugee camps near the 
major Lebanese coastal cities.34 The magnanimous acceptance of the refugees proved to 
be a voluntary, one-time event for the Palestinians as a Lebanese expression of solidarity 
with the Arab cause. Gradually, the refugees peacefully integrated into Lebanese society. 
“While many Palestinians lived in refugee camps, others took part in the economic and 
intellectual life of the country. It was not until the emergence of Nasser’s militant 
platform that the Palestinians [became politically active] supporting pan-Arab politics. 
Leaderless, divided and dispersed, the bulk of the Palestinian population was until the 
early 1960s, politically passive.”35 The significance of this “passivity” was that it did not 
cause any societal friction with the Shi’a, nor more importantly, did it cause significant 
political competition. Once the PLO arrived from Jordan over the course of 1969 to 1971, 
this calm situation would change drastically. “After the 1970 PLO defeat in Jordan, the 
bulk of the PLO fighters relocated to south Lebanon, where they proceeded to supplant 
the legitimate authorities.”36 Starting in 1969, the Lebanese government would once 
again accept Palestinians within its borders; however, this time it was acquiescence to the 
PLO. The grudging, involuntary “acceptance” stemmed from PLO-sponsored, violent 
domestic political blackmail. The PLO’s arrival in Lebanon was to have polarizing and 
radical effects upon the fragile political landscape. 
b. The Six Day War and the 1969 Cairo Agreement 
The Six Day War of 1967 had the effect of shattering the belief in Pan-
Arab power based in Nasserism and cemented for the fledgling Shi’a political movement, 
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quickly developing under Musa al-Sadr, the necessity of an independent Shi’a political 
movement. Only a political cause run for the Shi’a by the Shi’a within Lebanon would 
have any measure of effectiveness for the historically deprived sect. 
The defeat of the Arabs under Nasserism also had the effect of causing 
political emotions of the Lebanese Arab “street” to reorient, aligning with the PLO’s 
revolutionary cause. The baton for an “Arab Cause” had now been passed from Nasser to 
Arafat. After the 1967 war, the influx of Palestinian refugees from Jordan and the 
Occupied Territories of Palestine accelerated. The political atmosphere in Lebanon began 
charging up, illustrated by the observation that after 1967, “every refugee was a potential 
[PLO] guerilla.”37 PLO sponsored attacks into Northern Israel from Southern Lebanon 
had begun. The Israelis responded to these attacks with a commando raid on the Beirut 
airport, on December 28, 1968, blowing up thirteen [empty] civilian Lebanese 
commercial airplanes. This attack formally marked the beginning of the tit-for-tat 
military activity meted out in a messy three-way conflict between the Israeli Defense 
Force (IDF) and PLO, PLO and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the IDF against the 
LAF. Of the three combatants, the under-strengthened and under-equipped LAF was 
haplessly caught in the crossfire as was the domestic Lebanese Polity. Geographically, 
southern Lebanon was the natural place for cross-border PLO guerilla activity to take 
place; the Shi’a living in southern Lebanon were about to become the most directly 
affected group by the years of warfare that were about to begin.  
The conflict caused ever-present tensions between Lebanese sects to grow. 
Christians blamed the PLO for Israeli attacks on Lebanon.  
Lebanese Muslims, for their part, particularly Sunni leaders, had a 
different reading of the problem. For them, the Palestinian struggle was 
part and parcel of the Arab cause they had supported ever since Greater 
Lebanon was formed. At first, after World War I, there was the Faisal-led 
Arab nationalist movement in Damascus, which championed the cause of 
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articulator of pan-Arabism. And since 1967, the PLO, with its powerful 
revolutionary symbolism, became the cause to which many turned for 
inspiration and leadership.38  
The Lebanese Shi’a were no exception to being caught up in the political fervor. 
Although Palestinian and Shi’a political goals were not identical, they were close enough 
to give the spirit of the PLO cause a resonant frame amongst the Lebanese Shi’a 
populace. 
The Cairo Agreement, signed on November 3, 1969, formally allowed for 
the formation of the infamous PLO “state within a state.” The autonomy of the PLO 
within Lebanon would continue until their expulsion from Lebanon in 1985. The net 
effect of the Lebanese government granting PLO autonomy within Lebanon had the 
appearance (and mechanics) of tacitly condoning guerilla activities against Israel. This 
perception was extremely volatile and radically destabilizing for the brittle confessional 
system.39 The PLO’s presence proved to be the most polarizing force within all of 
Lebanese politics. Consequently, it would lead to a sharpening of confessional sect lines, 
the formation (and/or strengthening of existing) of militias and the 1975 Lebanese Civil 
war. 
c. The Shi’a Militarize 
By 1974, the Shi’a of southern Lebanon had endured five years of 
disrupting, war-like events due to PLO-IDF cross border conflict. Although the Fatah 
branch of the PLO would at times train and equip the militant wing40 of what would 
become Musa al-Sadr’s Harakat al-Mahrumin, “Movement of the Deprived,” this 
paradoxical alliance would not last. In the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippor war, the 
political situation inside of Lebanon was turning into a turbulent mess as the PLO looked 
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to consolidate and capitalize on any political gains made by the outcome of the war. This 
process caused upheaval within the PLO, manifesting itself through armed conflict 
between internal factions. The upshot of this was an arms build up inside the PLO, as 
well as by outside Lebanese political factions. 
The PLO by this time were firmly (and literally) entrenched in refugee 
camps throughout the country, and were in geographic control of much of southern 
Lebanon, in what could be called a “rump state.”41 The “arms race” and de facto 
Palestinian autonomy created severe friction throughout political society from the offices 
of various Lebanese domestic political sects all the way up the chain of command to their 
representative Ministers of Parliament and cabinet-level positions of power. Lebanon was 
falling apart. The LAF could not enforce any of the “laws of conduct” established in the 
Cairo Agreement; they were too weak a military force and the PLO too strong. In taking 
the fight to the Israelis, the PLO was running roughshod over the LAF and any modicum 
of cooperation with their Lebanese “hosts.” The southern Shi’a were getting it worst of 
all. Although politically sympathetic to the PLO, their sympathy had pragmatic limits. In 
March of 1974, those limits were reached. 
Beginning in 1970, the guerrillas began to violate provisions of the Cairo 
Agreement liberally by extending military control over areas well outside of camps 
boundaries. “The display of weapons in public gatherings became a common occurrence; 
so were checkpoints to search passers-by on the outskirts of the camps.”42 This open 
display of militarization spread to areas well away from the “front-line” with Israel. To 
the Lebanese, there was no need for this and caused them to reconsider their hospitality 
towards the PLO. “The display of Palestinian military presence in civilian areas, away 
from the battlefront with Israel, was regarded as an act of defiance serving no purpose 
other that to intimidate the civilian population. This attitude was shared not only by the 
Christians but also by the Shi’a and the Druze, particularly in the south, where villagers 
bore the brunt of Palestinian-Israeli confrontations.”43 
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The situation came to a head, marked by a speech given by Imam al-Sadr 
in Ba’albak, Lebanon on March 17, 1974, located in the future Hezbollah stronghold of 
the Biq’a Valley. His speech encapsulated the Shi’a’s predicament: no protection from 
the Israelis, no protection from the PLO and no support from the Lebanese government. 
Al-Sadr had initially tried to work within the system using the Lebanese Supreme Islamic 
Shi’i Council (LSISC) to no avail.  
Government neglect was patent, Communists and Ba’athists were tapping 
the frustration and anger of the Shi’i community, and his earlier, more 
restrained efforts had borne little palpable success. The situation of the 
moment was well captured by his rhetorical query: ‘What does the 
government expect, what does it expect except rage and revolution?’ It 
was in the March rally that Imam Musa launched his popular mass 
movement, Harakat al-Mahrumin. With his movement he vowed to 
struggle until the security needs and social grievances of the deprived–in 
practice the Shi’a’–were satisfactorily addressed by the government.44  
The last option was to form a mass movement, and a militant one if necessary. 
Although an avowedly peaceful man, the onset of the Lebanese civil war 
one year later, in 1975, overcame any ideological reservations he may have had for the 
practical necessity of a militia to protect the residents of the south.45 The complicated 
factional allegiances of various warring blocs during the civil war saw Amal take a 
relatively minor role in both numerical support and military action. The main 
contribution of al-Sadr was waking up the Shi’a with the “political mobilization of his co-
religionists” and a reduction in the authority of the ineffective traditional Shi’a elites–the 
‘zu’ama.’ “It bears repetition that Imam Musa only led a fraction of his politically 
affiliated co-religionists. It was the multi-confessional parties and militias that attracted 
the majority of Shi’i recruits, and many more Shi’is carried arms under their colors than 
under the banner of Amal. And in war as in peace, the Shi’is suffered disproportionately; 
by a large measure, they incurred more causalities during the civil war than any other sect 
in Lebanon.”46 
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d. Full Political Mobilization of the Lebanese Shi’a 
Without question, the most important development in Lebanon during the 
1980s has been the emergence of an assertive, politicized, but riven Shiite 
community.47 
Although Amal was a minority player during the civil war, Musa al-Sadr 
served to energize the Shi’a politically. Only three more events would accelerate and 
definitively mobilize the Shi’a community: (1) the IDF’s Operation Litani in March 
1978, (2) the disappearance/ assassination of Musa al-Sadr in Libya in August 1978 and 
(3) the Iranian Islamic Revolution in January 1979. The Israeli invasion of Southern 
Lebanon in 1978 under Operation Litani was, for the most part, a tactical and strategic 
success. It strove to destroy the ability of the PLO to operate in southern Lebanon by 
driving a wedge between the increasingly resented PLO fedayeen and the locally 
victimized Shi’a. The dynamic of dispossession, political for the Shi’a and geographic for 
the Palestinians, fomented an initial natural allegiance. However, as the PLO’s power 
grew within Lebanon, so did their corruption and negative impact upon their Shi’a hosts. 
By 1978, any sympathy the Shi’a may have had for the PLO in 1969 had run out and they 
became enemies of the PLO. The group that would take on this resistance was a 
revitalized Amal. In an effort to, “protect their families, homes and villages, many Shi’is 
either joined Amal or actively supported it.”48  
The disappearance of Musa al-Sadr elevated him to the status of a national 
martyr conferring a divine rightness upon his movement and to Shi’a political activism. 
Achieving great fame in “disappearance,” al-Sadr boosted Amal’s popularity and cast it 
as the legitimate Shi’a political party within Lebanon.  
Lastly, the 1979 revolution in Iran illustrated the greatest political example 
of what Shi’a activism could accomplish. To any fence-sitting Lebanese Shi’a, the, 
“deposing of the Shah in January 1979 served as an important exemplar, demonstrating 
what a pious, well-organized and motivated umma (Islamic community) could 
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accomplish in the face of oppression and unjustness. Furthermore, a new regime in 
Tehran promised to be an important source of material and political support.”49 More 
importantly, “It served as an important spur to the political mobilization of the Shi’a in 
Lebanon, without being a model for the emulation for the majority of the community.”50  
These three events are not the end of the story–they are just the end of the 
beginning and explain how the Lebanese Shi’a political environment could be shaped in 
such a way as to make it receptive to an Islamic revolutionary message. The defining line 
in the sand marking the start of Hezbollah would come in 1982. The Israelis would re-
invade southern Lebanon in 1982, under Operation Peace of the Galilee, in a successful 
effort to expel the PLO from Lebanon permanently. However, despite this tactical 
success, the IDF had made a strategic blunder. “Within months of Israel’s June 1982 
invasion, when it became clear that Israel had no intention of disengaging from Lebanon 
anytime soon, a variety of groups across the political spectrum began to organize attacks 
against the Israeli occupation forces.”51  
The re-entrance of an “occupying force” inside of Lebanon forever 
changed the favorable paradigm IDF presence previously had had amongst the PLO-
beleaguered Shi’a. It is important to note that the 1982 invasion provided the most 
significant political opportunity–the root cause–for the formation of Hezbollah. The 
importance of the three events of the late 1970s is that they fully politically mobilized the 
Shi’a transforming them into fertile political ground suitable for adherence to a 
movement. Hezbollah took root in this fertile ground by advertising a radicalizing 
message of Islamic resistance and revolution. Although their posture was radical, for the  
 
 
                                                 
49 Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon, 56. 
50 Ibid., 58. The ‘emulation’ problem is a very real challenge currently faced by Hezbollah. Whereby 
Lebanese Shi’a appreciate the political strides revolution has achieved for Iranian Shi’a, Lebanese Shi’a 
are, after all, Lebanese, and also desire, in concert with the wish for a louder political voice, to continue to 
live in the far more open Lebanese society. The shift to accommodate these uniquely Lebanese desires that 
has occurred within Hezbollah, as will be discussed later, is that Hezbollah must evolve from a 
revolutionary, resistance group to a mainstream political party that enables Shi’a political gain and reform 
from the inside. Overthrow may have worked in Iran, but it is not appropriate for the Lebanese system. 
51 Norton, Hezbollah, 80, 187. 
 25
frustrated Shi’a masses, the volatile Hezbollah message struck a popular cord in a 
resonant and contemporary way. Their previous standard bearer–the secular, “main-
stream” (and perceived-as-corrupt52)–Amal, no longer could. 
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III. HEZBOLLAH: FRAMING THE EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC 
FUNDAMENTALISM USING SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the historical factors responsible for the formation and 
support of the Islamist group Hezbollah utilizing the three components of modern social 
movement theory (SMT): political opportunity, resource mobilization and the framing 
process.53 The formation and longevity of Hezbollah as a resistance group and social 
organization stems directly from their ability to exploit a confluence of historical factors 
as explained in Chapter II, coalescing primarily with Hezbollah’s resistance posture 
against Israeli military harassment and incursion into Lebanese territory. The turbulent 
political history of Lebanon under the 1943, “mithaq al-watani” or national pact,54 
establishing the confessional division of political power, solidified the Lebanese Shi’a 
firmly into a disadvantaged political and social “third place” behind the [Maronite] 
Christians and Sunni Muslims, respectively. The consequence of this twentieth century 
arrangement was to give added grievance to pre-nineteenth century-old power struggles. 
This tension of political and economic inequity would galvanize and manifest itself as the 
Civil Wars in 1958 and 1975-89.55 
The political and social subjugation of the Lebanese Shi’a culminated to form a 
powerfully resonant psychological “frame” upon which Hezbollah could build a 
foundation of support. The demonstrative effect and exporting efforts of the Iranian 
Revolution coupled with the historical miscalculations by the Lebanese and Israeli 
governments provided the opportunity context upon which to construct an organization 
and social movement. Finally, the resources enabling the “framing process” and the 
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“political opportunity” were provided by sympathetic regional actors–Syria and Iran, and 
by the newly (and fully) mobilized Shi’a polity of Southern Lebanon and the Bekaa 
Valley. 
Hezbollah’s evolution towards moderation is apparent under the analytic lens of 
Social Movement Theory. Hezbollah’s evolution resulted from variations through time in 
the “framing process,” “political opportunity” and resource availability (or “resource 
mobilization”). These stages roughly divide into four distinct periods delineated by the 
resonance within society of the “frame,” the availability of “political opportunity” and 
“resources.” Stage one is the pre-nascent stage of early Shi’a mobilization under Imam 
Sayyid Musa al-Sadr where the resonant “frame” was a rejection of political quietism 
facilitated by the “opportunity” to embrace political mobilization within the Lebanese 
system. The second is the embryonic stage, embodied by the “opportunities”–some 
political, others ideological–offered by the Amal organization, the Lebanese civil war and 
the Iranian revolution. The third and most aggressive phase of Hezbollah’s development 
is the emergent phase, facilitated by the “opportunity” provided by the 1982 Israeli 
invasion and the newly abundant “resource mobilization” provided by the Iranian Islamic 
Revolutionary regime. Lastly, the current phase, integration into mainstream Lebanese 
politics, consists of a germane repackaging of all three SMT elements. The “frame” is 
relevant Islamic resistance. The “opportunity” is participation in institutional 
government, and the “resource” is a combination of Iranian (and Syrian) largess, 
domestic support and organizational political momentum. 
1. Social Movement Theory and Islamic Activism 
Early SMT, or “first generation SMT,”56 ascribed the support for Islamist 
fundamentalism to be a direct result of the “socio-psychological” school of thought and 
later on, to the “resource mobilization theory” (RMT). Both methods of study were 
accurate to a point, but fell short of explaining the complete picture as to why Islamist 
activism (of all types) emerged. 
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The first generation of social movement theory, rooted in “functionalism,” posited 
a linear relationship between problems arising in society and social mobilization in 
response to those problems.  
The socio-psychological school tended to oversimplify the causal mechanisms for 
Islamic activism into two sub-groups. The first is that social movements are derived from 
“structural strains.” “The underlying impetus for activism derives from the structural 
crises produced by the failure of secular modernization projects.”57 The second factor 
was a perceived “cultural imperialism” of western culture against Islamic culture in the 
post-colonial era of the region. “Rapid socioeconomic transformations tended to 
concentrate the wealth among the Western elite, state bourgeoisie, and corrupt state 
officials while concurrently generating negative side effects that impacted large segments 
of the population. …The sense of general economic malaise was compounded by 
exclusion from political power, which was monopolized by a small elite coterie that 
seemed to espouse an alien value system.”58 Socio-psychological explanations of societal 
strain and discontent proved to be necessary but not sufficient causal factors for Islamic 
activism. “The early socio-psychological approach to the study of social movements met 
with stark criticism for its overly simplistic formulation of an inexorable linkage between 
structural strain and movement contention, a criticism that is equally applicable to similar 
approaches in the study of Islamic activism.”59  
The paradox or flaw in the socio-psychological theory being, “Social movements 
do not correspond to the strain-movement paired logic.”60 In other words, drawing a 
direct causation-conclusion between a grievance in society and the creation of a social 
movement to address that grievance was too simplistic an analytical model. The 
analytical process needed more fidelity and the answer was to use the Resource 
Mobilization Theory. 
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“Resource Mobilization Theory views movements as rational, organized 
manifestations of collective action,”61 exactly what Hezbollah came to embody in the 
turbulent times of 1982-85. RMT filled the gap in detail of socio-psychological theory by 
analyzing and including, “resources and mobilizing structures, such as formal social 
movement organizations (SMOs). [These organizations] are needed to collectivize what 
would otherwise remain individual grievances.”  
For Hezbollah, the mosque and social services provided the necessary SMO 
vehicles on which to deliver their message. “Islamic NGOs constitute another set of 
widely used meso-level organizations. Islamic NGOs, such as medical clinics, hospitals, 
charity societies, cultural centers and schools, provide basic goods and services to 
demonstrate that “Islam is the solution” to everyday problems in Muslim societies.”62 As 
the quote implies, in lieu of a weak central Lebanese government, Hezbollah stepped in 
and provided all of the aforementioned services and was able to, “put a friendly public 
face”63 on the medium that promotes the Islamic message without alienating the diverse 
sectarian polity of Lebanon.  Hezbollah served as an “umbrella group” that deftly fused 
existing civil society and service organizations (and militia) under one “roof” or unifying 
organization. Hezbollah injected resources in conjunction with ideology to bolster these 
pre-existing, but weak organizations.  
For example, Hezbollah set up Bahman hospital to service the sprawling slum of 
West Beirut. Through the utilization of extensive funding from Iran–some estimates put 
the monetary support of Hezbollah at up to $100 million per year–state-of-the-art, 
inexpensive health care is offered to the public. Judith Harik’s interview with a young 
Shiite woman is demonstrative of Hezbollah’s public relations/social services strategy,  
I was surprised when a young Shiite woman I knew expressed displeasure 
with the hospital. When asked for details, she said that her father had 
received excellent care there, but that she and her sisters had resented the 
fact that they were not allowed to accompany him inside the facility. This 
was because there were not wearing the headscarves required by the 
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Islamic dress code! This anecdote illustrates the sorts of things that 
alienate some of the more secular-oriented members of the Shiite 
community who find Hezbollah too straight laced for their tastes and 
lifestyles. On the other hand, it also sheds some light on how the meeting 
of material needs might override such feelings and encourage political 
loyalty after all.”64  
By directly employing the “social services” strategy, Hezbollah is able to, “offer a 
concrete, visible example of what Islam can provide, in contradistinction to the state’s 
secular modernization failures.”65 
Lastly, the final component of modern SMT is the “framing process.” The 
“framing process” is the process through which grievance, resources and action are tied 
together. It is the “glue,” which gives the social movement a resonant, tangible “thing” on 
which to rely. It can be a slogan, issue of the day or just a popular feeling in society. 
Three “tasks” must be accomplished to have an effective framing process. 
First, movements must construct frames that diagnose a condition or 
problem in need of redress. This includes attributions of responsibility and 
targets of blame. Second, movements offer solutions to the problem, 
including specific tactics and strategies intended to serve as remedies to 
ameliorate injustice. And third, movements provide a rationale to motivate 
support and collective action. Motivational frames are needed to convince 
potential participants to actually engage in activism, thereby transforming 
bystander publics into movement participants.66 
Hezbollah has exploited the cultural framing process, as have other Islamic 
fundamentalist movements, by framing the movement as a struggle over meaning and 
values. Hezbollah used “meaning” and “values” as a potent “one-two punch” through 
which to deliver their message. The “value” was Islam and the “meaning” was resistance 
to Israel. 
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Building upon the success of the Iranian revolution, the early founders of 
Hezbollah sought to latch onto the “values” component building upon the, “Islam is the 
solution” frame.  
An important component of most Islamic movement diagnostic frames is 
the blame placed on the spread of Western values and practices for a wide 
variety of social ills, including rising unemployment, stagnant economic 
development, soaring debt, housing shortages, dwindling public social and 
welfare expenditures and so forth. The argument is that the true path to 
development and success is outlined in the sources of Islam. So long as 
Muslims follow this ‘straight path,’ they will be rewarded for their 
faithfulness.67 
In tandem with the legitimacy derived from wrapping themselves in the cloak of 
“golden age” Shi’a Islamic values, the message of resistance could resonate with equal, 
relevant legitimacy. In framing resistance as the Islamic action to take, resistance to Israel 
could take center stage as issue number one. Resistance became part-and-parcel of a 
larger, timeless struggle for Shi’a religio-political justice. 
B. THE ORIGINS OF THE HEZBOLLAH’S “FRAMING PROCESS” 
If Islam was to be the solution to the downtrodden Shi’a of southern Lebanon, the 
Bekaa Valley and the slums of Beirut, how did Hezbollah market their particular brand of 
Islamic fundamentalist activism? To examine this, it is first necessary to review once 
more the roots of Hezbollah through not only a historical perspective as was done in 
chapter II, but now specifically utilizing the analytical lens of SMT. The first phase of 
analysis centers on the secular Shi’a party of Amal and their resistance to Palestinian 
domination. 
In the 1960s, Palestinians [further] displaced out of Israel by the 1967 war, 
flocked to southern Lebanon, and took up refuge. This influx of population taxed the 
already underdeveloped and rural Shi’a infrastructure of the region. 
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At first, the Shi’a were sympathetic to the cause of the Palestinians as both classes 
of people were members of “deprived and dispossessed groups.”68 However, as time 
passed, cumulative effects turned Shi’a public opinion against the Palestinians and the 
PLO. These factors were: (1) The Palestinian Liberation Organization’s (PLO) “state-
with-in-a-state” authoritarian activities over the Shi’a residents of southern Lebanon (“its 
officials were accused of rape, robbery and extortion”),69 (2) being perpetually caught in 
the crossfire over the cross-border fighting between the PLO and Israelis and (3), the 
general sense of war-weariness caused by the brutal Lebanese civil war. In fact, because 
the political interests of the PLO and Lebanese Shi’a were aligned for a time during the 
civil war, “once full-fledged civil war erupted in 1975, the Shi’a became the cannon 
fodder for the fedayeen. Indeed, more Shi’a died in the fighting than members of any 
other sect.”70 All these factors took their toll on the beleaguered Shi’a population’s 
tolerance. “Against this background, the Lebanese Shi’i Muslims mobilized their political 
efforts.”71 
A defining and coalescing “political opportunity” was brought about in 1969, with 
the founding of the Lebanese Supreme Islamic Shi’i Council (LSISC) under the 
chairmanship of Al-Sayyid Musa al-Sadr. The official inclusion of the council as a Shi’a 
Muslim representative body into the Lebanese government gave Al-Sadr a prominent 
voice for Lebanon’s Shi’a. Al-Sadr, also known as Imam Musa, was a widely respected 
Iranian-born Shi’a cleric of Lebanese ancestry who founded the militia-wing of the 
predominant Shi’a reform movement of the time: the “Movement of the Deprived.” His 
militant offshoot was called the Lebanese Resistance Detachment that when translated 
and turned into an acronym, spells “Amal,” the Arabic word for “hope.” Leading Amal, 
and particularly with his chairmanship of the LSISC, Sadr’s political star rose. 
Ultimately, he became a threat to the entrenched (and corrupt) Shi’a elite of the Lebanese 
political scene, and left a legacy of awakened Shi’a activism. It was his belief that the 
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Shi’a were not to, “accept their deprivation fatalistically; he believed that as long as his 
fellow Shi’i could speak out through their religion they could overcome their 
condition.”72 
The goal of Imam Musa, when he moved to Lebanon in the 1950s, was to become 
the “paramount leader of the Shi’i community.” To this end, his first significant act was 
the founding of a vocational institute in a southern Lebanese town.73 Thus, al-Sadr was 
able to “frame” his nascent social movement with religion, leverage the “political 
opportunity” given him by the LSISC and mobilize “resources” to build institutions such 
as the vocational institute. All three of these components bolstered Amal, whose ultimate 
political philosophy revolved around the tenets of, “secularism (for government), 
liberation, Islamism and reformism–often couched in demands for more access to 
political privilege and for stamping out corruption.”74 It is important to note, however, 
that although the political atmosphere of Lebanon continued to devolve into one where 
violence and militias exerted more and more operative pressure upon the Lebanese 
political system, Sadr preferred to use Amal and his voice on the LSISC to work “within 
the system.” Although he did vie for more power within the government, Sadr was never 
a proponent of the complete overthrow and rebirth as an Islamic Republic. It is clear from 
a May 1977 working paper penned by the LSISC, that al-Sadr truly believed in 
preserving the multi-sectarian diversity of the Lebanese state.75 Likewise, the charter of 
Amal, “puts forward an idea of Lebanon as the outcome of ‘a tolerant melting pot of 
patriotism.’”76 
In 1978, Imam Musa mysteriously disappeared on a trip while in Libya. His 
[presumed] death cemented his legacy as an activist leader amongst a major bloc of 
Lebanese Shi’a with a twist of mystical irreverence; his “disappearance” (mostly likely 
an assassination by the Libyan government working on behalf of entrenched elites in 
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Lebanon), coincided with the Shi’a legend of the “Hidden Imam.” Al-Sadr’s 
disappearance permanently inscribed Shi’a activism into the Lebanese political 
landscape. From this point forward, Musa Al-Sadr turned out to be the father of the first 
formal “frame” of the Lebanese Shi’a social movement that, many “frames” later, would 
become an Islamic fundamentalist movement: Hezbollah. 
The evolution of Hezbollah from within Amal neatly corresponds to modern SMT 
that posits,  
that frequent disagreements and framing contests over meaning encourage 
competitive pressures as various groups produce and disseminate 
schemata. …Such competition takes place within the movement itself. 
…Intra-movement divisions (such as hardliner-soft-liner, conservative-
liberal, young-old, ideologue-pragmatist) can create internal framing 
disputes as each faction attempts to assert its own frame for movement-
wide adoption.77  
This is precisely what happened as time passed within Amal. At the end of the Lebanese 
civil war, Amal went from being the “dynamic and progressive” movement founded by 
Al-Sadr, to one with a, “full-blown patronage system with all the corruption, inefficiency 
and inequity that Amal had [originally fought against].”78 Hence, Amal became a corrupt 
fixture of the very political landscape it had hoped to change. This new reality did not 
resonate well with all members. The devolution into corruption, cooptation by the State, 
subservience to Syria79 and other un-popular actions, further provided fuel to the 
smoldering fire of discontent brewing within some quarters of Amal. The time was ripe 
for an offshoot to form. Until this point, however, the “political opportunity” to do 
something about it had not availed itself. 
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C. “POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY” AT LAST: THE ISRAELI INVASION OF 
LEBANON 
The successful overthrow of the Shah and the formation of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran provided the crucial framing mechanism on which Lebanese Shi’a Islamic 
radicals could further build an ideology. Against this backdrop, the leadership of 
Hezbollah emerged–at first a cabal,80 but then by the mid-1980s, with the resources of 
Iran (and Syria), emerged to challenge Amal and the others. “[The] Iranian revolution 
had encouraged the growth of “Islamic” activism and aided the formation of Shi’i 
fundamentalist-militant groups.”81 According to Naim Qassem, the Deputy Secretary-
General of Hizbullah, just after official victory was declared (in post-revolution Iran) and 
the Ayatollah Khomeini was declared the leader of the Shi’a Umma, dialogue with the 
Shi’a clerical community in Lebanon began in earnest. These dialogues lead to the 
establishment of formal lines of support. At the time in 1979, these lines of support were 
ideological in nature with most effort being applied to creating an, “appropriate means of 
liaising with the Islamic Revolution’s leadership.”82 
Central to the emergence of Shi’a activism at the beginning of the 1980s was the 
small group of soon-to-be Hezbollah leadership, having studied theology in Najaf, Iraq. 
Qassem makes the case that if Qom was the intellectual birthplace of the Iranian 
Revolution, then Najaf was–if not the birthplace–the intellectual crossroads where all the 
future leaders of Hezbollah had studied at some point. The three main rising stars of 
Hezbollah at this time were Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, Raghib Harb and Shaykh Subi 
Tufayli,83 all of whom would go on to head the organization at various times.  
The ideological and cohesive effects of the Iranian revolution with respect to 
striking a “resonating frame” with certain motivated radicals within Lebanon cannot be 
overstated as an absolutely critical “necessary condition” of Hezbollah’s formation. 
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Moreover, Norton argues that, “…there was little understanding of the developments 
under way among the Shi’i Muslims of Lebanon and no analysis was made of the impact 
of [the Israeli] invasion on them. Even if Israel had not launched its invasion of southern 
Lebanon in 1982, the young would-be revolutionaries among the Shi’a would have 
pursued their path of emulating Iran’s Islamic revolution.” However, “by occupying 
Lebanon rather than promptly withdrawing, Israel wore out its warm welcome and 
provided a context for Hezbollah to grow.”84 
On June 6, 1982, when Israel launched its attacks on Lebanon, two of Hezbollah’s 
future leaders, Harb and Tufayli, were in Tehran, Iran at the annual Islamic Conference. 
“Iran immediately volunteered to help its Lebanese brethren and the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) were swiftly dispatched to Baalbeck in the Bekaa 
Valley.”85  
Finally, the requisite ingredients for an Islamic fundamentalist social movement 
came together: (1) the political opportunity generated by the Israeli invasion, (2) the 
correct frame of resonance created by the Islamic Revolution and (3) a sufficient resource 
base: Iranian funding and IRGC technical advisors. The “official” declaration of 
Hezbollah as a political and social movement was not to take place until three years later, 
but the foundational seeds were finally sown in June of 1982. From their base in the 
Bekaa Valley, “the Iranian Revolutionary Guards took charge of Hezbollah’s security and 
resistance operations. Iran’s backing, combined with the presence of a core of dedicated 
[Lebanese Shi’a] men, [enabled] Hezbollah over the next two years to operate 
underground from its main base, Baalbeck, in the eastern Bekaa Valley. Baalbeck was 
not under Israeli occupation and provided the group and the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards with a safe haven from which to work and organize the movement. It was also 
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worked under the banner of the Lebanese National Resistance and did not claim credit for 
any of the new, daring attacks that had started to make an impact among the Israeli 
soldiers.”86 
With a full-blown resistance to Israeli occupation underway and material support 
from its patron Iran assured, recruitment of personnel became the number one priority for 
the organization. Hezbollah’s clerics undertook this task by spreading the Islamic 
Revolutionary ideology in whatever venue they could–mosques, funerals, and community 
centers [Husseinyahs]. Building upon the “master frame” of Islam, the clerics painted the 
resistance and expulsion of the Israelis as an unjust grievance; a sub-frame that resonated 
well with resentful Shi’a throughout Lebanon. 
D. CULTIVATING A CONSTITUENCY 
Although Hezbollah was aggressive in their ideology and military tactics, this did 
not translate into assured success. The first years were marked with setbacks. An 
important lesson learned by Hezbollah in the first three years of their formation was how 
to be politically savvy and read their potential constituency base. Since their rationale for 
being was, “Islam is the solution,” and, “neither east nor west” (in reference to favoring 
neither the U.S.’s nor the U.S.S.R.’s way of life), they imparted strict Islamic behavioral 
standards upon the areas they operated in and slowly took over. This was most evident in 
West Beirut and the beach towns of the south. From 1983 to 1986, as they gained ground, 
Hezbollah’s social services were being established, most notably 17 medical clinics and 
two hospitals.87 While the social services did garner support from the populous, 
Hezbollah suffered setbacks from the imposition of their social conduct standards.  
As the Hezbollah’s martial presence and influence spread out from the Bekaa 
Valley, to the southern Beirut suburbs, and to Southern Lebanon,  
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…by the end of 1983, it was becoming more noticeable that a new force 
was in town. Few Lebanese had yet comprehended the nature of the force, 
but late that year and in early 1984, West Beirut was turning into a bleak 
and frightening city. The face of the once famously cosmopolitan capital 
was undergoing a swift transformation. With the Shiite takeover of West 
Beirut, heavily bearded Hezbollah militiamen became increasingly visible 
in the city’s battered streets. They wore green bands around their heads 
bearing inscriptions such as, ‘Allah Akbar.’ Women who were considered 
to be dressed in an improper manner were often harassed by the radical 
newcomers. Shops selling alcohol were sometimes sent a warning in the 
form of a few sticks of dynamite hurdled at their front doors. The few 
popular restaurants which remained open hung signs on their entrances 
with the words ‘Family restaurant only’ insinuating that they were ‘dry’ 
premises.88 
[By mid-1986] Hezbollah [had] begun to alienate itself from the people 
whose support it needed most: the residents of South Lebanon. …They 
were angered at having to bear the brunt of the reprisals [from the 
Israelis]. They were also outraged by the extreme transformation which 
was taking place in the South as it came under the influence of 
Hezbollah’s religious militancy. Shortly after its arrival in the south, the 
group banned the sale of alcohol in shops and restaurants and prohibited 
parties, dancing and loud music.89  
Inexplicably, they also closed coffees shops. This had the effect of depriving,  
the old men who used to frequent [the shops] in the afternoons and early 
evenings of their simple pastime of playing cards and backgammon. A 
strict code of Islamic behavior was imposed in the towns and villages 
bringing with it some extreme interpretations of what was considered 
permissible behavior. Although there were those who were happy to abide 
by the new regulations and restrictions, many others rejected them.90 
The conduct codes ruined the local service economies.  
Hezbollah’s hard-line restrictions only served to isolate the area and 
further undermine the already battered economy. Popular weekend retreats 
on the coast became ghost towns. The Lebanese boycotted the restaurants 
and went in search of places without restrictions, where alcohol could be 
served without fear of harassment from the Islamic militants. Mixed 
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bathing was banned and women were forbidden from wearing [swimsuits]. 
Tyre, which used to pride itself on having one of the best stretches of 
beach in Lebanon, spent many summer months empty of clients. Those 
who wanted to enjoy Lebanon’s long season of sunshine simply stopped 
going south, while the residents of southern villages traveled north to the 
beaches around Sidon and Beirut. The region had become a warlike state 
severed from the rest of the country.91  
Timur Goksel, a Lebanese academic and Senior Political Advisor to UNIFIL,92 
summarized the attitude and mistakes of Hezbollah at the time,  
Until 1988, [Hezbollah was] paranoid, very unkind to foreigners, too 
suspicious and secretive, impossible to talk to and communicate with. 
[They were] extremely, unrealistically fundamentalist. When they tried to 
take over people’s lives, Hezbollah lost their support. They disregarded 
the one thing that the Lebanese, and in particular the southerners, are 
renowned for–the high level of importance they place on their 
individuality.93 
It is a telling statistic that 38% of the medical facilities created from 1983-1987, 
to include both hospitals, clinics and pharmacies, were constructed in 1986.94 This was 
the same year internal Hezbollah analysis appears to have identified that they had over-
reached with the fundamentalist Islamic message and that their support-base was 
beginning to wane. There was also resurgent competition from the secular Amal party. 
E. HEZBOLLAH MOVES TOWARDS MODERATION: THE “INFITAH” 
Two significant events took place in 1985: the pull-back of the Israeli military 
from the outskirts of Beirut to south of the Litani River (in Southern Lebanon), and 
Hezbollah formally declaring itself as a resistance organization and Islamic 
fundamentalist movement. They did so with an ‘open letter’ to the Beirut Daily Star 
newspaper.95 The 1985 “withdrawal” of the IDF signaled the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s 
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credentials as a formidable resistance force that could successfully exert pressure on the 
heretofore “invincible” IDF. “Hezbollah’s singleness of purpose in terms of its pursuit of 
Islamic goals was apparently rock solid. Foremost among these goals, of course, was 
jihad against the Israelis.”96  
Following introspection by Hezbollah and its analysis that it was losing popular 
support, 1989 marked the restructuring of the organization. Hezbollah had a crisis of 
confidence. Three events provided the political opportunity for the moderates of the 
organization to enact these structural changes. First, the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini 
caused the once untouchable resource support levels that Iran had been furnishing 
Hezbollah to become a budgetary topic of debate within Tehran. Ultimately, assistance 
from that point forward would fluctuate from year to year based upon the economic 
fortunes of the oil market. Secondly, the notorious leadership cohesion that had been a 
hallmark of Hezbollah to this point fractured. With their leading spiritual and political 
mentor physically removed from the scene, suppressed dissent openly surfaced. Thirdly, 
the end of the Lebanese Civil war was in sight. This last factor most likely pushed 
elements of the group to conclude that some (or most) of the original sub-frames of 
resonance would have to change. It was one thing to believe in completely tearing down 
the Lebanese political structure when it was in the throes of a chaotic civil war–it was 
quite another to dismantle an established structure in peacetime. 
1. Restructuring 
Restructuring of Hezbollah came in the forms of moving away from the radical 
policies of kidnapping, militant jihad against [destruction of] the Lebanese political 
system and lifting the general cloak of secrecy that shrouded the organization’s 
motivations and decision-making. The adjustments that allowed for this ideological shift 
were twofold, the most significant of which was the decision to participate in mainstream 
Lebanese politics–elections. This would be accomplished through the re-framing of 
classical “jihad,” expanding its definition to allow for participation in elections.97 
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Secondly, to aid the first objective, the militant arm of Hezbollah would be streamlined, 
downsized and completely separated from the political and social entities of Hezbollah.98 
This de-linkage (or delineation) of the militant from the civil within Hezbollah would 
give them the necessary internal political space to allow their candidates to enter 
mainstream politics.  
The move from secret organization to a transparent one was not instantaneous; in 
fact, it is ongoing. Seemingly out of character for Hezbollah, the new tactic employed by 
this thoroughly decisive group upon their entrance to the mainstream political area was 
one of “deliberate vagueness” with respect to key issues of heated debate: namely their 
long-term aspirations for the structure of the Lebanese governmental system and the 
desired end state of the fight with Israel. Did the “new, restructured” Hezbollah still 
require a Lebanese “Islamic Revolution” to occur and was “annihilation” of Israel an 
ongoing strategic goal? 
Political opportunity again opened up with the end of the Lebanese civil war, the 
signing of the Ta’if Accord. The Taif Accord of 1989, also known as the “Taif 
Agreement” and “National Reconciliation Accord,” provided a plan for ending the civil 
war through national reconciliation, achieved by reform of the confessional system with 
an eye towards a more equitable distribution of political power-shares. Key to the 
provision was that it also called for dissolution of the various militias (under Syrian 
supervision) with one exception: Hezbollah was allowed to keep their militia due to its 
re-designation from “militia” to “resistance movement.”99 The unique status accorded to 
Hezbollah’s armed wing stemmed from tacit consent in the form of a “modus vivendi” 
from Syria (and Iran).  
The secure position of Hezbollah established with respect to maintaining its 
militia under the auspices of an “Islamic Resistance” group (not a confessional militia), 
“enjoyed wide, though not unanimous, support in Lebanon, where the Israeli occupation 
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was seen as an impediment to the country’s recovery.”100 With their role as resistance 
organization secure, the group could turn to fielding candidates for the upcoming 1992 
Parliamentary elections. Participation in elections tested the “revolutionary” tenets of 
Hezbollah. However, Ayatollah Khamenei gave his blessing101 and Hezbollah jumped 
into the process with both feet.  
In tandem with this decision to participate in elections, were the election of 
Hassan Nasrallah to Secretary General in 1992,102 and the dissent of the early radical 
leader Subhi al-Tufayli (who would later be expelled from the group). Hezbollah 
embarked upon a “get to know us” campaign sponsoring community outreach programs 
as part of is greater strategy of “infitah.”103 The result was winning 12 of 128 seats of 
Parliament. Hezbollah’s political strategy was working. Despite its initial popularity 
setbacks in the early 1980s, Hezbollah had successfully framed its legitimacy as a 
resistance force and civic steward representative of the people.  
Acting like everyone else certainly convinces many Lebanese today that 
Hezbollah is not likely to try to supersede the limits of the system it has 
worked so hard to join, while at the same time broad interaction with 
Christians appears to have greatly reduced the threatening image with 
which Hezbollah began. These actions convinced many Lebanese that 
Hezbollah’s radical militancy was reserved [exclusively] for the Israelis 
rather than the destruction of the freewheeling Lebanese way of life.104 
F. CONCLUSION 
Following the end of the Lebanese civil war, the decision by Hezbollah to 
participate in elections marked a sea change in the original founding precepts. Hezbollah 
clearly moderated its fundamentalist Islamic ideology from 1985 to 1992. This 
moderation culminated with electoral participation in 1992. The events of history 
following 1992, namely, the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 
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2000, the 2006 war with Israel and the 2008 civil strife following conflict over 
Hezbollah’s telecommunications autonomy and unity government issues, further 
illustrate the pragmatic (if not further moderated) approach Hezbollah has taken towards 
integration into the established Lebanese political system. 
Detractors of Hezbollah’s moderation point to the martial method in which they 
chose to resist the 2008-attempted seizure of their telecommunications network as proof 
that Hezbollah has no genuine intention to act within mainstream political participation 
norms. Essentially, Hezbollah will participate in the system, but when it does not get 
what it wants, it will resort to using force. However, as important a component that 
having a resistance force is to the “brand” that is “Hezbollah,” it is a telling fact that in 
the summer of 2000, following the Israeli withdrawal, “a serious debate arose within 
Hezbollah about whether to focus on Lebanese politics and themes, such as corruption, or 
to maintain the resistance posture both in Lebanon and the Middle East.”105 Hezbollah 
ultimately decided on the latter course of action (for now) as demonstrated by their 
vigorous resistance to Israel in the summer of 2006. However, just the fact that the 
subject of giving up the resistance element is openly considered lends credence to the 
larger argument of moderation delineated by Social Movement Theory and the adjunct 
that, “the ballot box is the coffin of radicalism.”106  
The data indicate that when given the opportunity to participate in politics 
at the price of moderation, movements will alter their very nature to 
respond to this stimulus. Hezbollah’s experience demonstrates this 
dynamic. Not only had the group moderated to enter electoral politics, but 
also it reframed its central objective, forgoing its objective of an Islamic 
state.107  
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
If inclusion breeds moderation, then what conclusion should one draw from 
Hezbollah’s actions since their entrance into politics in 1992 and the unilateral Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000? Even the most optimistic observer would not be 
faulted for concluding the Hezbollah is not moderating at all, it is simply superficially 
changing its public image. One could argue that,  
the 2008 model of Hezbollah is one of a pragmatic terrorist organization 
that is far more dangerous than that of the revolutionary Hezbollah of the 
1980s. In fact, the movement hasn’t abandoned its goals, but has changed 
its pace of application. It operates simultaneously within the Lebanese 
political system and outside it, a fact that grants it [freedom of action] in 
both arenas.108 
If ostensibly, Hezbollah exists to counter Israeli aggression and occupation, then 
what happens when, in practical purposes, the source of aggression109 and occupation no 
longer exists? Does this mean that Hezbollah will decide to simply cease to exist as a 
movement, or at the very least, lay down its arms and disband its militia? Several recent 
events of history can test this hypothesis: (1) the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 
February, 2005, and the resultant expulsion of Syrian military units from Lebanese soil in 
April 2005,110 (2) the 2006 “July War” between Israel and Hezbollah, (3) the May 2008 
military takeover of Beirut by Hezbollah (resolved by the Doha Agreement), and (4) the 
upcoming Hezbollah election strategy of June 2009.  
The assassination of Prime Minister Hariri marked a sea change in Lebanese 
domestic politics. PM Hariri, and the March 14th Coalition that executes his political 
cause, represented a deliberate shift away from direct Syrian control in Lebanese politics. 
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“Hariri was admired for spearheading the rebuilding of Beirut after the country's civil 
war, from 1975 to 1990. Many Lebanese blamed Syria for the killing, citing Hariri's 
patriotism and strong sense of Lebanese independence.”111 Whether the Syrian 
government or Hezbollah directly sponsored or was involved in the attack is not the 
immediate point or at least not currently. If the UN investigation does reveal definitive 
links, that would be a political bombshell and clearly demonstrate that Hezbollah is not 
moderating. Until such results are made public, perhaps Hezbollah deserves the benefit of 
the doubt, if for no other reason than the Hezbollah of today has learned a lot since their 
1985 inception, becoming very sophisticated and politically savvy. Hezbollah appears to 
be too pragmatic to become implicated in such a (potentially) politically damaging plot. It 
is one thing to directly challenge the IDF through attacks (resistance), an action they cite 
as raison d’être, it is quite another to be a sponsor of domestic political assassination. 
This would mean that Hezbollah hypocritically rejects the mainstream political inclusion 
of which they have actively sought to become a part (and support). 
What is apparent is that Hezbollah is a client of Syria, and with a decrease in 
Syrian influence in Lebanon (i.e., the Syrians no longer control both sides of the border), 
a decrease in Hezbollah’s resource base is bound to occur. This is not in the interest of 
Hezbollah, particularly its militia, since the Lebanese-Syrian border is a source of 
weapons for Hezbollah. Assassination controversy aside, Hezbollah’s actions are 
consistent with its own domestic political interests demonstrated by alignment with the 
pro-Syrian election bloc for this June’s upcoming election.112 Overall, Hezbollah’s 
actions surrounding the Hariri assassination demonstrate moderation. 
If one metric of moderation is a reduction in armed conflict perpetrated by 
Hezbollah, then standing in direct opposition to the “moderation theory” is the July 2006 
war with Israel. Since the 2000 unilateral withdrawal of the IDF, Hassan Nasrallah, the 
Secretary General of Hezbollah, has skillfully played a game of brinksmanship with 
Israel. However, he overstepped his bounds with the July 12, 2006 Hezbollah abduction 
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of two IDF soldiers, providing the pre-text for a full-blown IDF military campaign. Prior 
to July 2006, “Hezbollah's low-level campaign against Israel was carefully crafted to 
maximize its domestic political returns (vis-à-vis Syria) and support Iranian strategic 
objectives, while falling within the perceived limits of Israeli tolerance.”113 Nonetheless, 
the instigation of a maximal confrontation, although a miscalculation, was cleverly used 
by Hezbollah to garner support. Clearly, fighting with Israel that inflicted between $2.8 
and $3.6 billion dollars worth of damage114 upon the Lebanese state does not indicate a 
moderating stance on the part of Hezbollah. The group’s demonstrated willingness to 
fight toe-toe with the IDF gains them domestic credibility and regional support. 
“Hezbollah won a resounding political victory at home, at the expense of constrained 
freedom of action to fight Israelis abroad, a state-sanctioned indulgence that most 
Lebanese Shiites would just as soon the group give up (while remaining armed).”115 As 
long as the Lebanese state remains aloof (and tactically powerless) to the armed status of 
Hezbollah, there is no incentive for Hezbollah to change its brinksmanship behavior. The 
fact that the LAF cannot disarm Hezbollah if it wanted to is not lost on Hezbollah. The 
ability to use force at will is a political “ace-card” Hezbollah is more than willing to play. 
In this respect, Hezbollah has not moderated. 
The evidence of the willingness of Hezbollah to “play their ace” (force) against 
domestic opponents manifested itself May 6, 2008116 with fighting between pro-
government militias and Hezbollah in the worst sectarian fighting since the end of the 
civil war in 1990. The fighting stemmed from direct confrontation over a government-
sponsored move to shut down a telecom network operated by Hezbollah as well as the 
removal of the allegedly Hezbollah-friendly chief of security at the Beirut airport. 
Despite the root cause, the ramification was that Hezbollah was able to flex it muscles 
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and, “show Prime Minister Fuad Siniora’s government who really is in charge.”117 This 
event demonstrated two things: (1) that Hezbollah’s militia was not reserved strictly for 
fighting the IDF, confirming the worst concerns of their domestic political opponents, 
and (2) although Hezbollah may have overstepped its bounds in turning Hezbollah 
fighters loose in Beirut, Hezbollah quickly showed restraint by voluntarily turning any 
occupied city territory118 over to the LAF after hostilities had subsided. This duality of 
action in this example: tactical excess and strategic restraint underscore why observers 
can see both earnest reform and malevolent self-interest in the actions of Hezbollah. 
Lastly, the election strategy of June 2009 continues this duality of purpose: a 
willingness to form coalitions (with Amal, and the Christian-based Free Patriotic 
Movement) to win a majority stake in government, while at the same time, stating that it 
does not wish to extend control beyond the 11% (14 seats) of Parliament it already 
controls. “This is just one of the steps Hezbollah has taken to insulate itself and its allies 
from the likely portrayal of an opposition victory as a Hamas-style “take over” of 
Lebanon.”119 This kind of politically astute strategy illustrates the important difference of 
pragmatism exercised between implementing Hezbollah’s political program versus 
putting into practice their political ideology. The politics of “the program” is far more 
liberal, inclusive and willing to compromise than the narrowly focused, radical and 
religious “ideological” platform. In short, Hezbollah makes calculated distinctions 
between theory and application. 
The author concludes that the evidence shows that Hezbollah is no longer a 
revolutionary group bent on changing Lebanese society into an idyllic Islamic Republic, 
nor are they a well-adjusted, moderate and integrated mainstream political party. 
Hezbollah currently occupies the transitional middle ground. Until Hezbollah is willing to 
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stand upon the merits of its, “infitah policy in the Lebanese public sphere by agreeing to 
participate in a sectarian-confessional political process, while earning the reputation of 
probity, transparency, accountability, and integrity in its political and socio-economic 
work,”120 and not rely upon use of the militia when political currents run against 
Hezbollah’s favor, the jury is still out. 
Hezbollah deserves credit for moderating their goals from that of creating an 
Islamic State to actively participating in mainstream Lebanese politics. Conversely, one 
could argue it is just the sign of the times. The late 1960s and 1970s were heady times 
when revolution was politically “in vogue.” The 1990s and 2000s are a different time and 
the world has changed. Globalization has altered the socio-economic landscape. Do the 
leaders of Hezbollah really want Lebanon to become another Iran? After looking at the 
economic morass Iran has become makes divergence from an Islamic Republic less an 
exercise in political moderation and more a witness to simple mathematics and pragmatic 
economic policy. 
Since 2000, Hezbollah’s behavior has vacillated between positive signs of 
moderation: partial regret for the 2006 war, voluntarily giving back Beirut in 2008 and 
political teamwork with former rivals in 2009. There have been negative signs of 
Hezbollah acting like their 1985, “radical old-self:” starting the 2006 war with Israel, 
turning their militia on domestic rivals and coyly shying away from taking on the full 
responsibility of electoral consequence and governance in 2009 (thus far). Part of this can 
be attributed to classic Hezbollah political subterfuge. However, if Hezbollah wants to be 
taken seriously by the entirety of the Lebanese body politic, and looked at as a party that 
could actually administer Lebanon like rational politicians, it must align its ideology and 
practice by making further concessions to adopting a moderate stance of leadership. 
Perhaps they have evolved as far as they can, given the external factors of their 
client-state benefactors: Iran and Syria. Given the frosty nature of Israeli-Iranian and 
Israeli-Syrian relations, Hezbollah is somewhat stuck propagating a proxy foreign policy  
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of each. For there to be any change in Hezbollah harmonizing its ideology and practice, 
the next dominoes to fall must be a Syrian-Israeli rapprochement as well as a two-state 
Israeli-Palestinian solution.  
The real test of moderation will be if Hezbollah can lay down its arms.  
In Lebanon, the opening of the political system and the prospects for 
democracy hinge on inter-sectarian harmony. Amal has joined Hezbollah 
in creating a Shi’a front that has participated in elections and now joined 
the government. …As Lebanon moves in the direction of democracy, it 
will have to confront the question of distributing power among its various 
communities in accord with their numbers.121 
Has the Hezbollah’s militia become a strategic crutch upon which it 
unconsciously rests? Its organizational discipline, resource-base and numerical strength 
allow it to hold the political trump-card within Lebanon’s wobbly confessional system. 
Hezbollah has demonstrated, “probity, transparency, accountability, and integrity” in its 
social service work, but can it maintain this same moral discipline when faced with the 
temptation of using force to get its way in the political sphere?  
Many think that a [Hezbollah-inclusive opposition bloc election] victory 
would embolden Hezbollah against attempts to dismantle its military 
wing. Others argue that political success might serve as a great moderating 
influence on the party by raising the stakes of a confrontation with Israel 
and saddling it with the mundane duties of making Lebanon’s trains run 
on time. If Hezbollah and its allies prevail on June 7, 2009, both these 
theories will finally by put to the test.122 
A. EPILOGUE: JUNE 8, 2009-LEBANESE POST-ELECTION RESULTS 
Given the election results of the June 7, 2009 Lebanese elections and victory of 
the pro-western “March 14th” coalition (“M14”) and the defeat of the “March 8th” 
Hezbollah-inclusive coalition,123 Hezbollah’s role in the next administration may largely 
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be limited to its role as a legislative spoiler with “veto power.”124 This is not to say 
Hezbollah lost per se: they won all 14 parliamentary seats they intended to win- even 
though their coalition lost. 
While Hezbollah’s potential veto power may stymie the efficient functioning of 
government, this type of political power is not inherently destructive of the state- as 
opposed to their militia’s power. Two questions remain. Firstly, will the newly elected 
parties join together to form a functioning unity government? 125 Secondly–and squarely 
at the heart of this thesis–if the “unity” government fails to meet with the political 
expectations of Hezbollah leadership, will Hezbollah lay down its arms and “fully 
moderate” at long last, accepting a “normal” stake in the greater Lebanese polity, or will 
it rebel using force of arms? Hezbollah has accepted the elections and signals that it is 
willing to discuss the status of its militia. Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s 
statements of June 8, 2009, regarding the election results seem to suggest a positive 
leaning in this direction:  
We accept these results... with sportsmanship and in a democratic way and 
we accept that the ruling camp [March 14] has achieved the parliamentary 
majority. [Lebanese] sovereignty needs the solidarity and cooperation of 
all parties. The opportunity to build a strong state is still present; it is 
linked to the will of all political parties. We want the majority to announce 
its real political platform, its priorities and objectives, and which path it 
will use to deal with the others. There is no reason [to] fear [Hezbollah’s 
militia] as long as the people support the resistance... [A] national dialogue 
would be held over this issue. “They” warned you that Hizbullah's arms 
might be used to impose on people choices they don't want. During these 
elections, the arms did not have any role. The resistance arms are for 
facing the Israelis and defending the country.126 
However, encouraging a future the quote above may imply, it is the author’s 
opinion that although Hezbollah has shown significant moderation from 1982 to the 
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present, history demonstrates that Lebanon as a country cannot remain politically stable 
and peacefully exist with a strong, non-state actor within its midst (e.g., the PLO 
experience). Conversely, if the Lebanese polity-- as a whole-- decides at some point not 
to support “the resistance” (against Israel) Nasrallah cryptically spoke of, then what? The 
true bellwether of Hezbollah’s “moderation” will be the future disposition of the militia. 
So long as Hezbollah holds a monopoly on the use of force within Lebanon, “passing” 
the true “test” of moderation and political integration will remain to be seen. 
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APPENDIX. MAPS OF LEBANON 
 
Figure 1.   Political Map of Lebanon127 
                                                 




Figure 2.   Distribution of Religious Groups of Lebanon128 
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